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INTRODUCTION: NEW BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
ECAUSE of the nature of this Texas Survey, this Article is limited

to developments involving state law, enforcement of the debtorcreditor relationship in bankruptcy, or cases that might not otherwise be addressed in a conventional bankruptcy survey.'
* Shareholder, Sanders Baker, Amarillo, Texas. B.S., Texas State University; J.D.,
St. Mary's University School of Law. Board Certified in Business Bankruptcy Law, Texas
Board of Legal Specialization.
** Shareholder, McGuire, Craddock & Strother, Dallas, Texas. A.B., cum laude,
Duke University; J.D., University of Texas School of Law.
1. For other surveys that focus exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, See J.
Westbrook et al., Recent Developments, University of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy
Conference (2005) (national survey, with supplement containing Texas and Fifth Circuit
case summaries); L. Phillips et al., A Whole New World: Current Events/New Case Update,
Farm, Ranch & Agri-Business Bankruptcy Inst. (2005); G. Pronske, Recent Developments,
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Of course, the key story in 2005 was the passage of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which
brought sweeping changes to the Bankruptcy Code. This summary will
address changes affecting Texas homestead claims and recent BAPCPA
cases, but most other BAPCPA amendments are beyond the scope of this
2
Survey.
One thing is certain: In the coming year, courts are likely to publish
conflicting opinions as they struggle to interpret and apply BAPCPA. As
with any new legislation, it is impossible to predict how courts will deal
with all of BAPCPA's unintended consequences. This is compounded by
the unfortunate fact that many of BAPCPA's provisions are poorly
drafted and do not fully contemplate all of the situations that courts will
face.
II.

BAPCPA: EFFECT ON TEXAS HOMESTEAD CLAIMS

The Texas homestead exemption has, to a large degree, survived
BAPCPA; however, in order to claim the unlimited Texas homestead exemption in bankruptcy, 3 debtors must meet two significant requirements.
In short, the debtor must have been domiciled in Texas for at least 730
days, and he must have acquired the homestead more than 1,215 days
pre-petition.
A.

DOMICILE REQUIREMENT-SECTION

522(b)(3)

A debtor must meet the Code's amended domicile requirement in order to claim a state's exemption-law protection. Section 522 and section
101 of the Code do not define "domicile." In a diversity context, the Fifth
Circuit identified "domicile" as "a matter of federal common law."'4 To
establish a new domicile under federal common law, the person must esState Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course (2005). See also, T. Hancock,
Fifth Circuit Bankruptcy Survey, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 575 (2005).
2. BAPCPA has been treated in numerous publications, including the American
Bankruptcy Institute Journal (various issues throughout 2005), the American Bankruptcy
Law Journal (Vol. 79, Issues 2 & 3, 2005), and the Texas Bar Journal (December 2005). See
H. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under
[BAPCPA], 79 Am.BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005); E. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §707(b),
id. at 231; M. Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments: A Tale of
Opportunity Lost, id. at 397; W. Brown, Taking Exception to a Debtor's Discharge: The
2005 Amendments Make it Easier, id. at 419; T. Carlson & J. Hayes, The Small Business
Provisions of the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, id. at 645; and L. Napoli, The Not-So
Automatic Stay: Legislative Changes to the Automatic Stay in a Case Filed by or Against an

Individual Debtor, id. at 749. For a critical commentary on BAPCPA, see K. Lundin, Ten
Principlesof BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (Issue 7,

Sept. 2005).
3. Chapter 41 of the Texas Property Code generally allows a homestead claim that is
unlimited in amount. Likewise, when the homestead acquisition took place does not significantly limit the claim. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2005).
See also TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50. But, BAPCPA now imposes additional requirements
before the debtor may utilize the unlimited exemption.
4. Acridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 334 F.3d 444, 448 (5th
Cir. 2003).
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tablish both (1) residence in the new state and (2) an intention to stay in
that state indefinitely. 5 Factors courts consider include where the person
pays taxes, votes, owns property, maintains permanent business ties or
employment, and belongs to clubs, churches, or the like. No single factor
is determinative.
New section 522(b)(3)(A) requires that the debtor's domicile be lo6
cated in the state for 730 days (approximately two years) pre-petition.
Alternatively, if the debtor's domicile has not been within a single state
for that period, then the debtor's domicile for the 180 days before the start
of the 730-day period (that is, 731-910 days pre-petition) governs. If the
debtor's domicile was in more than one place during the 180-day period,
then the law of the debtor's
domicile for the "longer portion of such 180
7
day period" will apply.
Although not expressly stated, it appears that the domicile must be established continuously for this 730-day period. Under such a reading, any
change in the domicile during the 730-day period moves the inquiry to
the preceding 180 days. What may be left unresolved is the impact of a
temporary relocation to another state during the 730 days. As mentioned
above, "domicile" is not defined under the Code, and diversity cases indi8
cate that temporary relocation does not change one's domicile.
If the domicile requirements effectively render the debtor ineligible for
any exemption, the debtor is still allowed to claim the so-called "Federal
Exemptions" under section 522(d). Under the "Federal Exemptions,"
the debtor can claim an exemption of up to $18,450 for real property that
the debtor "uses as a residence." 9
B.

1,215-DAY RULE-SECION 522(p)

New section 522(p) generally prohibits the exemption of any homestead interest in excess of $125,000 for property acquired within 1,215
days (about three years, four months) of filing. 10
There are two primary exceptions to this rule:
1. the debtor acquired the homestead with proceeds from his previous residence that he acquired outside the 1,215-day period, provided the two residences are in the same state; and
2. the homestead is the "principal residence" of a family farmer.'1
5. Id. (citing Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[M]ere presence in a
new location does not affect a change of domicile; it must be accompanied with the requisite intent.")).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(b)(4)(A), 522(b)(4)(A).
7. Id. § 522(b)(3).
8. Acridge, 334 F.3d at 448.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
10. Id. § 522(p).
11. Id. § 522(p)(2)(A). "Family farmer" means an individual and spouse engaged in a
farming operation with aggregate debts under approximately $3.2 million, of which at least
fifty percent arise out of a farming operation. See id. § 101(18); see also id. § 101(20) (defining "farmer") and § 101(21) (defining "farming operation").

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Presumably, those who establish a Texas homestead for this 1,215-day
period, even if they sold their own home (acquired before the 1,215-day
period) and rolled the proceeds into another, should be able to claim the
full homestead exemption. Increases in equity from appreciation or payment of regularly scheduled mortgage payments should also remain
12
protected.
Thus, this provision is unlikely to affect Texas debtors who have lived
in their homes for more than approximately 40 months before bankruptcy
(along with family farmers), provided that they do not fall within any
other limitations discussed below. Likewise, Texas debtors who have sold
a home acquired outside the 1,215-day period and rolled the proceeds
13
into a new home appear to be protected.
On the other hand, the homestead exemption may be limited to
$125,000, if the homestead was acquired within the 1,215-day window and
14
the debtor does not otherwise satisfy the rollover exception.

C.

EXCEPTIONS BASED ON WRONGDOING-SECTION

522(q)

Even if the debtor qualifies under the 1,215-day rule, his homestead
exemption may be capped at $125,000 if:
1. he has a felony conviction that demonstrates that the bankruptcy
case was an abusive filing;
2. he owes a debt arising from securities fraud; or
3. he owes a debt arising from criminal, intentional, willful, or reckless conduct that caused serious physical injury or death to another in the
15
preceding five years.
Limits imposed under the above provisions may not apply to the extent
that the interest is "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
6
and any dependent of the debtor."'

D.

FRAUDULENT CONVERSION-NON-EXEMPT
TO HOMESTEAD-SECTION

522(o)

An additional exclusion applies to any non-exempt property that a
debtor disposed of in the ten-year pre-petition period with the intent to
17
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.

E.

TEXAS CASE ADDRESSES EQUITY ENHANCEMENT

Judge Hale of the Northern District was the first to address the issue of
8
equity increases during the 1,215-day pre-petition period in In re Blair.'
12. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.13[2] (Matthew Bender 2005). See also In re
Blair, 334 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (Hale, J.).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(2)(B).
14. Id. § 522(p)(1).
15. As determined after notice and hearing. Id. § 522(q)(1)(A).
16. Id. § 522(q)(2).
17. Id. § 522(o).
18. 334 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
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In Blair, the debtors bought their home 1,773 days before the petition
date. At the time of their filing, the value of the home's equity was
$688,606. At least a portion of this equity resulted from the debtors making their regularly scheduled mortgage payments during the 1,215-day period. An unsecured creditor objected to the exemption on any interest
acquired by the debtors during the 1,215-day period that exceeded the
$125,000 cap.
The court took a common-sense approach and noted that "one does
not actually 'acquire' equity in a home. One acquires title to a home." 19
The debtors bought their home about five years before BAPCPA and a
year and a half before the start of the 1,215-day period. The debtors'
actual purchase of their home, which was completed well outside the
20
1,215-day period, reflected the "interest" acquired.
The court noted the clear legislative intent of the section 522(p) revisions. Specifically, Congress clearly intended to prevent out-of-state residents from relocating solely to take advantage of that state's
exemptions laws. The two-year domicile requirement and the 1,215-day
period addressed the "mansion loophole," unlike the pre-BAPCPA requirement, which was as few as 91 days. 2' Thus, the court allowed the
debtors to maintain their homestead exemption. Allowing a homestead
claim in equity that clearly resulted from regular mortgage payments or
general value appreciation was clearly the correct result given the lack of
unusual pre-payments or other actions.
III.

BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A.

INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS

In Rousey v. Jacoway,2 2 a pre-BAPCPA case, the court sought to determine whether a debtor's right to receive IRA payments is due to, or "on
account of," age within the meaning of the section 522(d)(1)(E) exemption provision. Also, the court examined whether IRAs qualify as "similar plans or contracts" within the meaning of the section 522(d)(10)(E)
23
exemption provision.
In Rousey, the Chapter 7 debtors had accounts that qualified as IRAs
under the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that withdrawals made
before the account-holder turns 59 1/2 are, with limited exceptions, subject to a ten-percent tax penalty. In their schedules under section
522(d)(1)(E), which provided that debtors could reasonably exempt their
right to receive a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing,
19. Id. at 376.
20. Id. at 376-77. See In re Virissimo, 332 B.R. 201, 207 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005) ("The
monetary cap applies if the debtor acquired such property within the 1.215-day period
preceding the filing of the petition.")
21. Blair, 334 B.R. at 378.
22. 544 U.S. 320 (2005).
23. Pre-BAPCPA, the Code was silent as to the exempt status of certain IRAs. As
discussed below, by including IRAs in amended section 522, the BAPCPA may have rendered Rousey somewhat moot.
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annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death,
age, or length of service, the debtors exempted the IRAs. The Chapter 7
trustee objected to the exemption, and the bankruptcy court sustained it.
On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, concluding that
IRAs were not similar to any of the listed plans or contracts, because the
debtors' unlimited access to their IRA funds meant that no factor in section 522(d)(10)(E) accounted for the payments. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Noting a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted
24
certiorari.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that under section 522(d)(10)(E),
a right to receive payment under an IRA must meet three requirements:
1. the right to receive payment must be from a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract;
2. the right to receive payment must be on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service; and
3. even then, the right to receive payment may be exempted only to
the extent that it is reasonably
necessary to support the accountholder or his dependents. 25
In analyzing the second requirement, the Court said that "on account
of" means "because of." Thus, the right to receive payment must be because of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service. Further, the
Court found that the statutes governing IRAs causally connected the
debtors' right to payment to their age. The Court found the ten-percent
tax penalty to be substantial. Thus, it concluded that the debtors' IRAs
provided a right to payment on account of age. 26
Next, the Court determined that IRAs were "similar" to stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, annuity plans or contracts. To be "similar," an
IRA must be like, though not identical to, the specific plans or contracts
listed in the statute. The Court ruled in the debtors' favor, agreeing that
their IRAs were similar to the programs listed because they provided a
substitute for wages and were not mere savings accounts. 27
Because the Supreme Court found that the debtors' IRAs fulfilled the
section's requirements (conferred a right to receive payment on account
of age and were similar to enumerated plans), it reversed the Eighth Cir28
cuit's decision.
B.

EFFECT OF ROUSEY POST

BAPCPA

BAPCPA now provides specific exemptions for IRAs and other retirement accounts for debtors who elect either state or federal exemption
24. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 324.
25. Id. Previously, in Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court implied that IRAs
were exempt under section 522(d)(10)(E). 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
26. Rousey, 544 U.S. at 325-28.
27. Id. at 329-31.
28. Id. at 332.
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treatment. 29 The BAPCPA caps IRA exemptions at $1 million, excluding
rollovers, and generally does not limit most other retirement plans. To say
that BAPCPA rendered Rousey moot may be an overstatement; however,
30
BAPCPA's more specific provisions limit Rousey's significance.
IV. HOMESTEADS & EXEMPTIONS
A.

HOMESTEAD Is WHERE THE HOME Is

Two Survey-period cases reflect that courts will not protect a premature homestead claim in property that the debtor has not yet occupied.
In In re Gandy,31 the debtor elected federal exemptions under section
522(d)(1), claiming approximately 6.6 acres as exempt. However, the
debtor was not currently using (nor had he ever used) the property as his
residence. The debtor testified that he intended to use the property and
had done some prepatory work to that effect.
The precise language of section 522(d)(1) allows exemption of property
that a debtor "uses as residence." While the court noted that it had to
construe federal exemption claims liberally in favor of the debtor and
refer to state law if necessary, even applying a liberal construction, the
plain language of the federal statute negated any reason to resort to state
law. Under the plain, present-tense language of the federal statute, the
debtor could not claim the exemption in property he had not yet
32
occupied.
Notably, the bankruptcy court mentioned in dicta that if it had resorted
to Texas law, it would have allowed the exemption given what it perceived as the "liberal protections afforded by the Texas Property Code
and the Texas Constitution" and, presumably, slightly different language
in the state statute.
Gandy's dicta, however, was not necessarily in accord with at least one
Texas court of appeals case issued during the Survey period. McKee v.
Wilson 33 addressed a debtor's state-law homestead claim in a yet-to-beoccupied custom home. The McKees entered into a construction contract, and after a dispute arose, their builder ceased work. Some months
after the McKees signed the new-home and mechanic's-lien contract, they
sold their existing home and began living in their new one. Shortly there29. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), (c), (d)(12).

30. See generally D. Osborn, J. Martinec, M. Johnson, Asset ProtectionAfter the Bankruptcy Act, 68 TEX. BAR J. 1006 (December 2005); see also M. Howard, Exemptions Under
the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments: A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,
414-15 (Rousey is substantially mooted by BAPCPA). For additional commentary on
Rousey, see Serena Green, Recent Development, 58 ARK. L. REV. 471 (2005).
31. 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.).
32. Id. at 808-09. See also 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (allows an exemption to the extent of
"the debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $18,450.00 in value, in real property... that
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence...") (emphasis added). The
court found In re DeMasi unpersuasive given the statute's plain language. 227 B.R. 586
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1998). (relying on state-law precedent to allow an exemption based upon a
contingent future interest).
33. 174 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
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after, the builder filed a mechanic's lien. The trial court found it to be
valid and ordered foreclosure. The McKees claimed that the property already constituted their homestead since they intended to move into the
home from the contract's inception. They also argued that the builder's
lien was invalid because he failed to comply with certain homestead construction-contract requirements.
The court disagreed because the McKees were still living in their established homestead at the time of the custom construction contract. An
established homestead continues until abandoned. 34 Therefore, they had
no homestead interest in the custom lot and home until they abandoned
their old homestead-that is, until they left it and could show evidence of
an intent not to return.35 Additionally, a family can have only one homestead at a time. 36 The court concluded that because a homestead already
existed, it could not be abandoned while still being used as the family
home. The McKees could not acquire another homestead by mere inten37
tion to occupy it sometime in the future.
Finally, the McKees argued that the filing date of the lien affidavit
should be central to determining the property's status as homestead. The
contractor, on the other hand, asserted that the date of the construction
agreement controlled. The court found as a matter of law that it was required to look to the original construction agreements's timing, rather
38
than the subsequent recording of the lien affidavit.
Gandy and McKee reach similar results, but for different reasons. The
court in Gandy construed an unambiguous federal statute, which used
present tense to refer to a residence's actual use. McKee, on the other
hand, was based on established Texas homestead-law concepts and the
general principle that a person can only claim one homestead at a time.
In dicta, the Gandy court indicated that it would have allowed a homestead claim under Texas law; however, McKee shows that under certain
circumstances in what can often be a fact-intensive inquiry, Texas law
may indeed be otherwise.
Both opinions reflect that a debtor is limited in his ability to assert a
homestead claim in property that is not yet occupied. Under state law,
mere intent to occupy specific property as a homestead combined with
overt acts to that end may suffice, provided there is no existing homestead.
34. See Norman v. First Bank & Trust, Bryan, 557 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ refd n.r.e.).
35, Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 175 S.W.2d 960, 963 (Tex. 1943) (acquiring a new home
is not necessarily a new homestead). But see Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 254 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that if a debtor acquires a new homestead, he abandons the old one); Norman, 557
S.W.2d at 801 (requiring evidence of homestead abandonment), and Panhandle Constr.
Co. v. Wiseman, 110 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, writ ref'd w.o.j.) (acquiring a new, permanent home is the best evidence of abandonment).
36. Silvers v. Welch, 91 S.W.2d 687, 687 (Tex. 1936).
37. McKee, 174 S.W.3d at 844 (citing Tawery v. Plainview Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 99
S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ ref'd)).
38. Id. at 845.
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That may not be possible, however, if a homestead already exists or actual abandonment of the previous homestead has not occurred.
B.

A

HouSE(BOAT) MAY STILL NOT BE A HOME(STEAD)

In re Norris39 was reported in last year's Survey. In that case, the debtors claimed a sixty-eight foot Chris-Craft boat as a homestead. The bankruptcy court upheld the trustee's objection, and the district court
41
affirmed. 40 The decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
Last year the Fifth Circuit issued a brief opinion noting the liberal construction of the Texas Constitution and Property Code regarding homestead claims, contrasted with Texas Supreme Court opinions referring to
the homestead as an "estate in land."'42 The court then certified the issue
to the Texas Supreme Court as follows:
Does a motorized waterborne vessel, used as a primary residence
and otherwise fulfilling all of the requirements of a homestead except attachment to land, qualify for the homestead exemption
under
43
Article 16, §§ 50 and 51 of the Texas Constitution?
It is likely that the supreme court will resolve this question by the time
this Survey is published.
C.

PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS

44

Goebel v. Brandley involved a mother who had enrolled in her employer's payroll-deduction program, through which she purchased a $200
savings bond each month for her minor son and daughter. About five
years later, a judgment was entered against the Goebels and the mother
became a judgment debtor.
Later, the judgment creditor sought to set aside the children's savings
bonds, claiming that they were fraudulently transferred by the Goebels.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the creditor, but
45
the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals found that the Goebels did not transfer a nonexempt asset. Rather, the payroll-deduction plan came out of the debtor's
46
current wages, which are exempt from garnishment or execution.
Therefore, because the exempt property (the current wages) was already
39. In re Norris, 316 B.R. 246 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004) (Rodriguez, J.).
40. See Roger Cox, Bankruptcy & Creditors' Rights, 58 SMU L. REV. 563, 578 (2005);
see also Joseph McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, id. at 917.
41. In re Norris, 413 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2005).
42. Id. at 530 (citing Lassiter v. First Huntsville Props., 826 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex.
1991)).
43. In re Norris, 413 F.3d at 530 (inviting the Supreme Court to appropriately reform
the issue to help resolve Norris).
44. 174 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

45. Id. at 361, 366. The judgment debtors filing for bankruptcy in 2003 did not appear
to affect the issues in this case.
46. Id. at 364. See also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28. Current wages are also exempt
from attachment, execution, or other seizure. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(1)
(Vernon 2005).
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beyond the reach of the creditor, conveyance of that property, whether
47
fraudulent or not, did not deprive the creditor of any rights to it.
Further, because the mother's current wages were transferred directly
to her children, the mother never actually received those funds and her
estate was never deprived of anything. Accordingly, the payroll deductions directly from the mother's current wages to her children were
upheld.
The Texas Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
D.

HOMESTEAD PROCEEDS

In re Jones48 involved unusual interplay between the Texas homestead
statute section that protects sales proceeds for six months and Bankruptcy Code section 727 regarding debtor ineligibility for Chapter 7 discharge. In Jones, sale of the debtor's homestead resulted in cash proceeds
of over $77,000. For a limited time, the Property Code exempted the
proceeds.

49

Two months before the temporary exemption ceased, Jones used a portion of that money on a down payment and some subsequent payments
on a pickup purchased in his fianc6e's name. Two months later, he filed
for bankruptcy. The court had to decide whether the transfer rendered
that portion of the proceeds non-exempt.
The court stressed that the proceeds exemption was not meant to protect the proceeds themselves, but rather to allow the claimant to invest
the proceeds in another homestead.50 Thus, Jones could hold the proceeds for six months to purchase another homestead, but the exemption
did not permit him to purchase other assets. The court also noted Fifth
Circuit authority that held that any remaining proceeds not used to
purchase a new homestead are "instantly rendered non-exempt."'5 1 The
court concluded that any other assets purchased with remaining proceeds,
even within the six-month period, are not covered by this narrow exemption and are rendered non-exempt. Because Jones purchased the pickup
with those proceeds, that asset was not exempt, and it remained subject
52
to the creditors' claims.
This left the court to determine whether Jones's transfer of proceeds to
his fianc6e violated section 727(a)(2)(A). Such a violation, transferring
property within a year pre-petition with an intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor, would deny Jone's discharge. 53 Intent in this context
could be proven by circumstantial evidence including family, friendship,
47. Goebel, 174 S.W.3d at 364 (citing Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833, 842-43 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied)).
48. 327 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Bohm, J.).
49. Id. at 301 (discussing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon 2005)).
50. Id. at 302 (stating that in spending the proceeds, Jones could not prejudice his
creditors' interests).
51. Id. (citing In re Davis, 170 F.3d 475, 483 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999)).
52. Id.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). See also In re Chastaint, 873 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1989).
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or a close relationship to the transferee combined with retaining possession of the transferred property. In this case, Jones purchased the pickup
in his fianc6e's name but continued to use it. For this and other reasons,
the court found that the debtor committed a fraudulent transfer and de5 4
nied him a discharge under section 727(a)(2)(A).
The court also denied Jones's discharge based on his failure to keep
and produce adequate records under section 727(a)(3). 5 5 The court noted
that, among other things, Jones could not account for much of the $77,000
in proceeds from the sale. Specifically, the court found that over $55,000
was spent "without any form of receipt or substantiation. ' 56 For these
57
reasons, the court denied the debtor's discharge.
V.

SECURED CLAIMS: COSTS & ATTORNEY'S FEES

Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for interest and costs
on certain secured claims. This typically involves a determination of a
"reasonable" fee, and it may also involve the weighing of certain equities,
including the impact on unsecured creditors and other constituencies.
Generally, fees will be allowed to holders of oversecured claims, provided
58
the fee is reasonable.
BAPCPA affected this issue during the Survey period. Specifically, the
phrase "or state statute" was added to the section; thus, reasonable fees
and costs may be awarded not only as provided for by contract, but also
under the state statute under which a claim arose. The full effect of this
59
insertion remains to be seen.
During the Survey period, Judge Isgur of the Southern District issued
60
two opinions that provide some guidance on this issue. In In re Valdez,
an oversecured creditor sought relief from the automatic stay, apparently
to foreclose on the debtors' homestead. The debtors' schedules reflected
$18,000 in equity, and no evidence was offered to dispute that assertion.
The court found insufficient cause to lift the stay, and the motion was
denied.
54. Jones, 327 B.R. at 302-03.
55. Section 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code also provides that unless such act or
failure was justified under all circumstances of the case, then a discharge will be denied for
failure to keep or preserve records. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3). It is not necessary to
demonstrate a debtor's fraudulent intent under this provision; "mere negligence in failing
to keep and produce records will suffice to bar his discharge." Jones, 327 B.R. at 302.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). See, e.g., In re Cummins Util., L.P., 279 B.R. 195 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2002) (Lynn, J.).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Presumably, this change may give rise to fee and cost recovery
in situations in which those items are specifically included as part of a claim arising under
statute. For example, Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides
for recovery of attorney's fees in certain contract claims. The issue in this context is
whether this is the kind of statute that Congress intended to be covered by the amendment.
See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997).

60. 324 B.R. 296 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

The movant sought recovery of its attorney's fees and expenses, specifically $425 in legal fees and $150 in filing fees incurred in filing and pursuing the motion. At the outset, the court acknowledged that the mere fact
that the motion was unsuccessful would not be a reason to deny attorney's fees. The court narrowed the issue to determine whether the creditor acted reasonably in bringing the motion in the first place:
[T]here is considerable precedent for allowing attorney's fees incurred in seeking relief from the stay, even though the motion is unsuccessful or never ruled on. The key criteria is61whether the creditor
acted reasonably in seeking relief from the stay.
The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had not directly addressed this
factual context; however, the court was convinced by another circuit's
simplified approach-that is, a simple determination of whether the action was "prudent." If the action is not "prudent" or is otherwise unrea62
sonable or unnecessary, fees would not be allowed.
In Valdez, the court, noting the substantial equity in the property and
the lack of any independent cause for relief whatsoever under section
362(d)(1) (such as failure to maintain insurance, pay taxes, etc.), held that
there was no real reason to seek relief from the stay. The court found
that the lender's filing of a motion was not a commercially prudent decision. Therefore, the court did not award attorney's fees. 63 The contested
matter's ultimate outcome was not determinative; however, taking action
that a court perceives as wholly unnecessary, or even premature, may
result in the denial of attorney's fees.
In 2004, Judge Isgur was also faced with determining whether an undersecured creditor may recover attorney's fees, even by agreement. In
In re Nair,64 the issue arose not so much in an adversarial context, but
when a proposed agreed order was submitted.
In Nair, the secured lender moved for relief from the stay, and the
parties apparently negotiated a proposed agreed order providing for certain adequate protection. Despite the fact that the motion alleged that the
movant was undersecured, the proposed order provided that the debtor
would pay $550 in the movant's attorney's fees. Noting the lack of authority and section 506(b)'s language, the court refused to enter the
agreed order and issued a show cause order regarding potential Rule
9011 sanctions.
The court first noted the lack of a general right of recovery for attorney's fees incurred in filing a motion for relief from the stay. Rather, the
61. Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Brunel, 54 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985)). In other words, the court looked to whether the creditor took the kind of
actions that "similarly situated creditors might reasonably conclude should be taken .... "
Id. at 300 (quoting In re Univ. Towers Owner's Corp., 278 B.R. 302, 305-06 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2002)).
62. Id. at 301.
63. "[T]he debtor .. .cannot be required to pay fees and costs pursuant to Section
506(b) for a motion [the movant] brought with no chance of success." Id. at 302.
64. 320 B.R. 119 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
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award of attorney's fees is specifically governed by section 506(b). More
specifically, a motion for relief from the stay is not an "action on a contract" to which state law would apply, but rather, a creature of federal
law.

65

The court articulated two concepts crucial to its finding. First, the
awarding of attorney's fees arises from the very same statutory phrase (in
section 506(b)) as the allowance of post-petition interest. In effect, the
undersecured creditor was no more entitled to attorney's fees than to
post-petition interest. The Supreme Court previously held that section
506(b) had the "substantive effect of denying undersecured creditors
post-petition interest on their claims." '66 Likewise, an award of attorney's
fees is not authorized under the statute's plain wording.
Second, the award of dollar-for-dollar attorney's fees to an undersecured creditor essentially sets that component of its claim apart as the
equivalent of a priority administrative expense. The court said that this
goes against not only specific section 506(b) limitations, but also the
Bankruptcy Code's basic distribution scheme. Unlike the oversecured
creditor, who is entitled to full payment, even with interest and attorney's
fees, "[an undersecured creditor's deficiency claim is merely entitled to a
pro rata distribution of the estate's residual. '6 7 In conclusion, the court
found that given the sheer volume of stay motions, a court must ensure
that proposed orders (even agreed orders) pass muster under Rule
9011-that the proposed relief has some statutory basis in the Code. Accordingly, the court entered non-monetary sanctions against movant's
counsel.
Other opinions addressing section 506(b) were also published during
the Survey period. Among those were In re 900 Corp.,68 which addressed
the subtle distinctions between assessing pre- and post-confirmation fees
and the applicability of section 506(b) to fees incurred post-confirmation.
Of significance in that opinion was the court's application of the "reasonableness" concept under state law in a situation that also involved reasonable fees under section 506(b). 69 The eight factors to consider in
determining the reasonableness of an attorneys' fees request are: (1) the
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (2)
the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in
the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship
65. Id. at 125 (citing In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 828, 106 S. Ct. 88 (1985)).
66. Id. at 126 (quoting United Sav. Ass'ns of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)).
67. Id. at 128. "This is an issue of great substance." Id.
68. 327 B.R. 585 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (Houser, J.).
69. Id. at 592.
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with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or conuncertainty of collection before the legal
tingent on results obtained or
70
services have been rendered.
A common theme among these and other cases is that fees need to be
not only reasonable, but also necessary in the context of a particular case.
As one court has stated in the past, "Section 506(b) is'71not intended as a
'
carte blanche for secured creditors to dun the estate.
VI.

OTHER BAPCPA CASES

Most of the new BAPCPA provisions took effect near the end of the
Survey period. Since then, a number of cases have been published that
provide some insight into how courts will apply these newer provisions.
Many of those cases should be treated in next year's survey; however,
here is a glimpse of what courts are dealing with:
At least three cases arising in the Southern District address the changes
to section 362, which limits bankruptcy stay protection available to so72
called serial filers.
At least three Texas cases address the credit-counseling requirement,
73
which for most individual debtors is now a prerequisite to filing.
Post-BAPCPA opinions are now being published on a regular basis. As
mentioned, it is impossible to predict how courts will address BAPCPA's
unintended (and intended) consequences.

70. Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818
(Tex. 1997)). See also Fluorine on Call, Ltd. v. Fluorogas, Ltd., 380 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004);

Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
71. In re Cummins Util., L.P., 279 B.R. 195 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). See also In re
Delaney Family, L.P., No. 02-46631-DML-11, 2003 WL 23957146 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003)
(Lynn, J.) ("One purpose of Section 506(b) is to protect estate assets from excessive fees by
oversecured creditors' attorneys exhibiting excessive caution, overzealous advocacy, and
hyperactive legal efforts.") (internal quotations omitted).
72. See In re Charles, 334 B.R. 207 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.); In re Collins,
335 B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.); In re Toro-Arcila, 334 B.R. 224 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.). The amended Code section in question is found at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c)(3)(A). When Charles was decided, it was apparently an issue of first impression.
73. See In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (Monroe, J.); In re Hubbard,
333 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Isgur, J.). See also In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr.
D. Md. 2005) (addressing the "exigent circumstances" exception arising out of imminent
foreclosure sale or imminent eviction proceedings).

